Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko sparked concern on Thursday by announcing that Russia had begun moving tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. Stating that storage facilities for the weapons were now operational, Lukashenko was asked by a journalist whether any weapons had already arrived in Belarus. He responded in a typically eccentric fashion, “Maybe. I will go and take a look.”
There is little to worry about here. For a start, Putin may well be sending these weapons to Belarus simply to make a public show to Lukashenko, the Kremlin, and those around Lukashenko that Putin has ultimate power over him. Lukashenko has been reluctant to fully engage with Putin’s desire to create a unified state and has notably avoided direct engagement in the war in Ukraine.
And while we will likely hear news of Russian nuclear weapons movements to Belarus in the coming days, NATO’s nuclear posture remains largely unchanged. Were NATO concerned, we would be seeing signs of that concern in new military activity. And their penchant for bluster aside, the Russians are competent at safeguarding nuclear materials in transit and in storage. Russian strategic forces retain a nuclear safeguarding tradition reaching back to the Soviet Union. This centers on the recognition that whatever tensions might exist with the West at any one time, the destructive power and politically existential import of nuclear weapons means they must be kept under strict control.
BIDEN AND REPUBLICANS BLAME EACH OTHER FOR DEFAULT THEY INSIST WON’T HAPPEN
This is not to say any Russian nuclear deployment to Belarus should simply be ignored. As Vladimir Putin faces increasing losses and escalating territorial pressure in Ukraine, he will once again be tempted to dangle the threat of nuclear weapons, hence why this nuclear deployment to Belarus was announced in March. Putin’s nuclear-dangling intent is not to provoke fear in Ukraine but rather to split the Western alliance structure. He wants to split the U.S., the U.K., Poland, the Baltic States and Norway/Finland, which tend to reject Putin’s brinkmanship, from others in Western Europe which tend to defer to it. In so doing, Putin might feasibly hope to see Ukraine come under Western pressure to make concessions to Moscow.
Still, even if he decided to order a nuclear attack on Ukraine, Putin would face three obstacles in effecting that outcome.
First, he would suffer a serious risk of being deposed by the Russian general staff. Again, the Russian military takes nuclear weapons very seriously and may not follow orders that would risk their nation’s absolute isolation and, in the worst case, a nuclear war with NATO. The Russian military knows, after all, that that’s a war they would lose.
Second, Putin would sacrifice his one remaining major power relationship. That with China. Yes, this relationship is growing closer each week. And yes, the Chinese have taken advantage of the trade-salivating submission of European leaders such as Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz in order to avoid any consequences for supporting Putin as he wages war on Europe. That said, were Putin to use nuclear weapons, China would face unprecedented European Union pressure that it either cut ties with Russia or see its ties with the EU cut instead. Considering Xi Jinping’s long-term objective of displacing the Western-led international order depends on his influence over Europe, he would almost certainly choose the former option.
Third, a nuclear strike on Ukraine would likely lead to direct U.S., British, and Polish military intervention against Putin’s forces in Ukraine. Any limited nuclear strike would thus have negligible battlefield value while simultaneously provoking the annihilation of Russian military forces. Putin would be defeated in Ukraine and left politically impotent at home. Russian culture and history suggest he would not stay in office for very long afterward.
