The West must face down Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship

As the war in Ukraine enters its twelve month with no clear end in sight, Moscow is once hinting at the use of nuclear weapons. Last week former president and close Putin-ally Dmitry Medvedev sent a stark warning to European leaders, saying that “nuclear powers have never lost major conflicts on which their fate depends”. This was swiftly followed by a prominent Russian commentator calling for a nuclear strike against Berlin in retaliation against Germany’s decision to allow its Leopard 2 tanks to be sent to Ukraine.  

For all the frenzied coverage of a potential nuclear conflict between NATO and Russia, the Kremlin’s threats – usually issued when it has suffered a setback on the battlefield – actually betray their own thinly veiled bluster. Russian military doctrine dictates that a nuclear strike follows “aggression against the Russian Federation with conventional weapons” in circumstances “when the very existence of the state is threatened”. And despite the threats regularly emanating from Moscow, there is no military threat to sovereign Russian territory.

Instead, any nuclear escalation is likely to result from threats to Putin’s position as leader, whether real or perceived. Much has been written about Putin’s state of mind during this war. It is clear that he holds no regard for Ukrainian sovereignty, and still views Ukraine through the myopic and outdated Cold War prism of a Soviet territory. Consistently fed poor intelligence by his generals, surrounded by yes-men reinforcing harsh group-think decision-making, and with no military background, we see in Moscow an increasingly isolated decision-maker, and one who consistently lacks the right information upon which to base strategic decisions. These decisions include the possibility of going nuclear amid continued battlefield failures at the tactical and increasingly operational level. 

The Russian leader’s increasingly erratic behaviour is not a reason for the West to back down. If nothing else, the actual state of the Russian nuclear arsenal is unknown. The flaws in Russia’s conventional capabilities highlighted throughout the past twelve months, and in particular the poor maintenance of equipment and its low serviceability, have raised the prospect of there being significant gaps in Moscow’s nuclear capability – and its credibility as a threat. 

Instead of shying away, the West needs to make clear its strategic objectives and give Putin room to plot an exit strategy within Russia – one that can handle a reality where Ukraine regains its pre-2014 territory. While isolating Russia diplomatically sends the right message that Moscow has become an international pariah, Ukraine’s allies do need to reinforce that their central objective is not to directly threaten the Russian state or its rightful territory, but to assist Kyiv in expelling Russian forces from Ukrainian soil.  

The British and American governments appear to believe that this objective includes Crimea, which Moscow continues to assert is Russian territory. The point that Western tanks and their Ukrainian operators would cease at the pre-2014 Russian border is an important one to convey; Russian forces in Crimea retreating in disarray with unclear lines of communication is the sort of situation which could result in misinterpretation and potential escalation.

This can be avoided if the West is clear in its messaging, and its willingness to support Ukraine in this eventual – and likely decisive – battlefield. Put simply, a return to the pre-2014 borders has to be conveyed to Moscow as the end goal for Ukraine – along with the point that this is hardly the sort of existential threat to Russia which would merit the use of nuclear weapons.

Robert Clark is the Director of  the Defence and Security Unit at Civitas. Prior to this he served in the British Army, including combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.